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Abstract 
We study lenders’ behavior in the peer-to-peer (P2P) lending market, where individuals bid on 
unsecured microloans requested by other individual borrowers. Online P2P exchanges are growing, 
but lenders in this market are not professional investors. In addition, lenders have to take big risks 
because loans in P2P lending are granted without collateral. While the P2P lending market shares 
some characteristics of the online markets with herding behavior, it also has characteristics that may 
discourage it. This study empirically investigates herding behavior in the P2P lending market where 
seemingly conflicting conditions and features of herding are present. Using a large sample of daily 
data from one of the largest P2P lending platforms in Korea, we find strong evidence of herding and 
its diminishing marginal effect as bidding advances. We employ a multinomial logit market-share 
model where relevant variables verified by prior studies on P2P lending are controlled. 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
Peer-to-peer (P2P) lending is a certain breed of financial transaction that occurs directly between 
individuals without the intermediation of a traditional financial institution.1 It has a short history, but 
has rapidly grown in recent years. The first online P2P lending company was Zopa 
(http://www.zopa.com), launched in 2005 in the United Kingdom. In the United States, Prosper 
(http://www.prosper.com/) was the first P2P lending firm, and opened to the public in February 2006. 
It is now the largest P2P lending platform, with over a million members and over $219 million in 
personal loans funded as of February 2011. P2P online exchanges are growing in the United States and 
United Kingdom as an alternative platform to traditional saving and investment (Slavin 2007). 
Harvard Business Review reports that every major bank will have its own P2P lending network within 
five years, and that P2P lending will be among the most important financial service innovations in the 
coming decade (Sviokla 2009). 
This new phenomenon has garnered significant attention from researchers. Many of them focus on 
social networks in P2P lending (Lin et al. 2009; Herrero-Lopez 2009; Freedman et al. 2008). In the 
P2P lending market, transaction costs are reduced by eliminating expensive intermediaries, but 
information asymmetry problems become more severe than in traditional markets. This is because 
most individual lenders in online P2P lending lack financial expertise, and the lending experience 
takes place in a pseudonymous online environment (Klafft 2008). In this situation, social networks 
between individuals mitigate adverse selection and lead to better outcomes in all aspects of the lending 
process (Lin et al. 2009). Social networks on Prosper reveal some soft information about borrower risk, 
and therefore have the potential to compensate for the lack of hard information (Freedman et al. 2008). 
Besides social networks, borrowers’ characteristics, including demographic characteristics, financial 
strength, and effort prior to making a request, are regarded as determinants of funding success in P2P 
lending (Herzenstein et al. 2008).  
Despite of those new experimental mechanism designs and system features, the risk of information 
asymmetry lenders face may not be erased easily. It has been studied that players exhibit herding 
behaviors in online commerce when they face risk of uncertainty such as information asymmetry. 
Herding behavior describes many social and economic situations in which an individual’s decision-
making is highly influenced by the decisions of others (Duan et al. 2009). Therefore, it has been 
theoretically linked to many economic areas such as investment recommendations (Scharfstein & 
Stein 1990), price behavior of initial public offerings (IPOs) (Welch 1992), fads and customs 
(Bikhchandani et al. 1992), and delegated portfolio management (Maug & Naik 1995). 
Duan et al. (2009) present that herding behavior could be especially prominent on the Internet for two 
reasons. The first is information overload. There is an excessive amount of information on the Web, so 
online users have difficulty understanding and using all the information (Brynjolfsson & Smith 2000). 
Doing what others do could be an efficient and rational way to make decisions in this circumstance. 
The second reason is that people can easily observe others’ choices on the Internet. Most online e-
commerce websites provide a way to sort their products in the order of previous sales performance. 
When a customer clicks on a book in one of the largest online bookstores, Amazon.com, he or she will 
not only obtain information about that book, but also see other items that previous customers bought 
with the particular book.  
According to Herzenstein et al. (2008), there is a considerable difference between the number of 
lenders bidding on funded loan listings and the number of lenders bidding on unfunded loan listings. 
The average of the former is 62.6, while the average of the latter is only 1.6. What makes such 
significant difference? Is it the outcome of rational judgement of investors or inflated by herding 
                                              
1 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/P2p_lending 
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behaviors? Investigating herding behavior in P2P lending market is the main objective of this study. 
Since P2P lending platforms are online, it is obvious that they satisfy the aforementioned conditions 
for herd behaviors that Duan et al. (2009) identify.  
When the lenders decide whether to invest their money in a loan request, they can verify the number 
of lenders who have already participated. If investors are influenced by the decisions of other investors 
(Devenow & Welch 1996), this number is a kind of signal for lenders. In other words, an auction that 
already has many bidders may be more attractive to lenders considering investment. We speculate that 
herding behaviors are more prolific in this market due to the possibility of adverse selection and the 
limited institutional knowledge mentioned above when lenders face unknown borrowers over the 
Internet. We empirically examine lenders’ herding behaviors in the P2P lending market.  
What makes this study interesting is two folds. First, we question whether herding behaviors exist in 
the P2P lending market because some characteristics of this market are distinctly different from those 
online markets where herding behaviors are observed. Herd behavior refers to people who do what 
others are doing instead of using their own information (Banerjee 1992). In other words, players take 
herding strategy because he or she believes that others are better informed than he or she. For example, 
herding behavior in the stock market is led by so-called experts (analysts). Many other cases of 
herding behaviors show that buyers rely on information gathered by other buyers of experience goods. 
Prior consumers already experienced goods and services, therefore, potential buyers believe that those 
experienced in prior to them have better information. Thus, they flock to popular goods or bands. 
However, online P2P lending does not seem to have such obvious source of the better information. 
Most of peers in P2P lending are not professional investors. In addition, auctions are not experienced 
goods when they are invested in. This is because it will take much longer time until the true 
information is revealed by loan default or payments on time. Therefore, these circumstances make us 
begin to doubt of the existence of herding in the P2P lending market where no clear superior 
information source is identified. In other words, is herding behavior triggered by the blind trust on the 
collective intelligence in online market? Secondly, we have so-called nano data from one P2P lending 
company that enables us to investigate the dynamics of herding behavior, which have not been 
explored fully to the best of our knowledge. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the related theoretical and empirical 
literature on P2P lending and herding behavior. Section 3 shows our research hypotheses with logical 
reasoning, and section 4 describes the data. In section 5, we develop and analyze the empirical model 
and discuss the results. We conclude the paper by mentioning limitations and future research in section 
6. 
2 LITERATURE REVIEW 
Since the primary characteristics of online P2P lending are disintermediation and reliance on existing 
social networks2, many of previous studies address roles and impact of social networks on P2P lending. 
Lin et al. (2009) found that social networks, especially their relational aspects, lead to better outcomes, 
including a higher likelihood of a loan being funded, a lower risk of default, and lower interest rates, 
using data from Prosper. Their study suggested that social networks as a new source of soft 
information can mitigate the problem of adverse selection, which is particularly severe in online P2P 
lending. According to Herrero-Lopez (2009), affiliation with Trusted Groups on Prosper doubles the 
probability of getting a loan request successfully funded. Freedman and Jin (2008) also suggested that 
social networks on P2P lending sites help alleviate information problems, but also found evidence 
against this argument. They revealed that the return gap between group and non-group loans is closing 
over time. In addition, Weiss et al. (2010) found that although the screening of potential borrowers by 
                                              
2 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/P2P_lending 
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groups can help mitigate adverse selection, groups could have a negative impact on a borrower’s 
probability of receiving the requested funds. Lenders who are not in the group might be discouraged 
from lending to a group member due to the group’s focus on certain special interests. Other 
determinants of success in online P2P lending have also been studied. Borrower attributes such as 
demographic characteristics, financial strength, and effort prior to making the request affect the 
likelihood of funding success (Herzenstein et al. 2008). Loan decision variables such as loan amount, 
interest rate offered, and duration of loan listing mediate between borrower characteristics and the 
likelihood of funding success (Herzenstein et al. 2008). Iyer et al. (2009) found that the credit score 
given to borrowers by Prosper is indeed related to underlying creditworthiness and predicts the 
likelihood of default.  
On the other hand, herding behavior has been theoretically and empirically explored in a variety of 
different fields. Graham (1999) studied herding among investment newsletters by developing and 
empirically testing a model that examines the incentives investment advisors face when deciding 
whether to herd. Pritsker and Kodres (1995) detected herd behavior by analyzing daily trading data on 
futures contracts. Devenow and Welch (1996) and Bikhchandani and Sharma (2001) created 
overviews of many papers on the economics of herding in financial markets.  
Decision makers in many cases of IT adoptions also herd. Kauffman and Li (2003) found that 
corporate decision makers in IT adoption invest in what was chosen by earlier adopters. Duan et al. 
(2009) empirically investigated informational cascades, which is one of the major mechanisms for 
herd behavior in the software downloading market. They controlled other factors that affect online 
users’ adoption decisions, and identified informational cascades. Their findings show that the 
download ranking of software products highly influences online users’ choice of product. Herding on 
eBay has been studied by Simonsohn and Ariely (2007). They found that online bidders prefer 
auctions with more existing bids, even though they are non-diagnostic of quality, which means that 
non-rational herding occurs on eBay.  
Analysis on herding in the online P2P lending market is in the initial stage. Krumme and Herrero 
(2009) presented simulations of different scenarios of herding behavior and reciprocity in an attempt 
to explain the observed bidding patterns of lenders. Herzenstein et al. (2010) defined herding behavior 
in online P2P lending as a greater likelihood of bidding in auctions with more existing bids. They used 
data from Prosper to empirically test herding behavior and employed logit models with a binary 
dependent variable. Wang and Greiner (2010) suggested that herding behavior in online P2P lending 
might lead to low return on investment (ROI), high risk-return ratio, and under-utilized lender money 
resources. Complementing these studies, we empirically explore herding behavior in the online P2P 
lending market using a multinomial logit market-share model. We differentiate our study through a 
completely dissimilar model and dataset.  
3 DEVELOPMENT OF HYPOTHESES 
3.1 Research Context 
This empirical study is conducted in the context of auctions on Popfunding 
(http://www.popfunding.com). Popfunding is one of the biggest P2P lending platforms in South Korea. 
It opened in June 2007, and as of February 28, 2011, it had 55,060 members and 12,927 requested 
loans, of which 1,099 loans had been successfully funded3.  
                                              
3 We retrieved information on the number of members and loans from the Popfunding administrator. The 12,927 requested 
loans included 163 ongoing auctions and 4,556 withdrawn auctions. A withdrawn auction refers to an auction in which the 
borrower has quit before the end of the auction. 
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Popfunding has a similar lending process and reverse auction mechanism to other P2P lending sites, 
such as Prosper and Zopa. First, a borrower requests a loan with a requested amount and duration; 
maximum interest rate; and borrower’s profile, including age, gender, and occupation. The borrower 
also posts a detailed description of the purpose of the loan and a plan for repayment, and emotionally 
appeals to lenders by explaining his or her urgent situation. To prove their creditworthiness and 
authenticity, borrowers can submit personal certificates, including identification, credit report, address, 
job, income, and tax information to the Popfunding platform operator4. Once a loan request is listed on 
the site, it becomes an auction on which Popfunding lenders can place bids. Also, Popfunding provides 
a Q&A board for each loan request where lenders can make direct requests to borrowers for additional 
information. Through the board, lenders can interact extensively with borrowers, and the interaction 
between them is visible to everyone on the lending site. Lenders are not only able to obtain 
information, but also form connections with the borrowers. Based on the collected information and 
borrower’s description, lenders decide whether to lend to the borrower and if so, how much money 
and what interest rate they wish to offer. When the total bid amount by lenders exceeds the amount 
requested by the borrower, the lenders with the lowest interest rates win the auction and are granted a 
stake in the loan. If a loan fails to attract a sufficient number of lenders, the loan is automatically 
cancelled by the system after the auction duration expires.  
The overall mechanism of Popfunding is similar to those of Prosper and Zopa, but there is an 
important difference between them. The main target customers of Popfunding are non-bankable 
borrowers whose credit scores are below the threshold of traditional financial institutions. In other 
words, Popfunding is trying to utilize its P2P lending platform for micro-financing. Therefore, their 
clients on the borrowing side are mostly desperate ones who often are lured to black financial markets 
while the three largest P2P lending sites (Prosper, Zopa, and LendingClub) report that only 
approximately 20% of their loans are for small businesses (Farrell 2008). Because of their desperate 
situation, borrowers are willing to submit and reveal much of personal information. This fact provides 
a fertile ground for possible herding behavior. Credit scores provides very little information to lenders 
because their scores are all bad with very little variance in this market and they have to rely on soft 
information while lenders in Popfunding face much bigger risk of adverse selection than those in other 
frequently mentioned sites. 
Visitors to the Popfunding site are able to view and bid on auctions. As of March 1, 2011, there were 
163 auctions posted by borrowers on the site. If a lender clicks on an auction, he or she can obtain the 
information mentioned above. In addition, Popfunding provides the status of each auction, allowing 
lenders to view participation rates5 calculated by Prosper. Lenders can sort auctions by participation 
rate.  
In summary, Popfunding lenders can gather information by analyzing the characteristic features of 
auctions and observing previous bidders’ choices. We investigate the herding behavior of lenders 
using Popfunding data6.  
3.2 Research Hypotheses 
When an individual has to make a decision, he or she gets the information from two sources. The first 
is based on one’s own knowledge about and analysis of the subject, and the other is derived from an 
observation of decisions made by others. If the individual is very knowledgeable and an expert in the 
                                              
4 Lenders who visit Popfunding can only confirm the existence of these certificates. Popfunding does not make public the 
contents of the documents. Partial information may be disclosed if a funded borrower delays payment for more than 10 days. 
5 Suppose that there is an auction in which the borrower requests KRW 2 million. If KRW 0.5 million is already invested in 
the auction, the participation rate of the auction is 25%. Lenders can also check the number of people investing in the auction. 
In Prosper, people are able to verify the identities of investors, but Popfunding does not disclose such information.  
6 We omit screen shots of the Popfunding site because the site is only available in Korean. It is very similar to other P2P 
lending sites such as Prosper and Zopa.  
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subject, his or her decision will hardly be influenced by others. If this is not the case, predecessors’ 
decisions will critically affect a decision maker. In other words, an individual will follow the decision 
making of others regardless of privately obtained information if he or she is unsure of his or her own 
knowledge. This is known as herding. 
In Popfunding, when a lender chooses an auction to bid on, he or she analyzes the auction’s own 
characteristics and, at the same time, observes the investment choices of others by checking the 
participation rate. Most Popfunding lenders are not professional investors. As we mentioned earlier, 
most borrowers have a low credit grade, which is assigned based on objective information. In this 
circumstance, it is difficult for a lender to have confidence in his or her ability to distinguish good 
auctions from bad ones. Therefore, we expect lenders to be exposed to herding behavior which will 
reply on the participation rate of an auction in this case. This is because the participation rate directly 
represents predecessors’ decisions.  
Potential bidders may try to predict a request’s likelihood of being fully funded based on its current 
level of participation. Table 1 presents the final participation rate of auctions after the duration expired 
which were conducted from June 15, 2009 to July 21, 2010.  
 
Final Participation Rate (%) Number of Auctions Portion 
0~10 1094 0.489 
11~20 260 0.116 
21~30 147 0.066 
31~40 82 0.037 
41~50 51 0.023 
51~60 37 0.016 
61~70 31 0.014 
71~80 26 0.012 
81~90 22 0.010 
91~100 17 0.007 
Over 100 469 0.210 
Total 2236 1.000 
Table 1. Distribution of Ultimate Participation Rate 
Assuming that this distribution is typical in this market, the estimated statistical probability of being 
funded of an auction with less than the current 10% participation rate at the given moment of time is 
less than 21% since only 469 bids out of 2,236 are ultimately funded. On the other hand, if the current 
participation standing is beyond 80%, its probability improves to about 0.923 since 469 bids are fully 
funded out of 5087 bids beyond 80% participation level.  
Hence, it can be easily shown that the probability of being fully funded increase as the current 
participation rate advances. Bidders will have more incentive to participate in auctions with higher 
participation rate, that is, herding. We therefore suggest the following hypothesis. 
H1: An auction with a higher participation rate attracts more bids8. 
Now, we turn our attention to net increase of the probability of full funding as the level of 
participation advances. As calculated above, if an auction has less than 10% of participation, its 
estimated probability of full funding is 21%, but if it advances to the next level of more than 20%, 
then the estimate improves to 41% since 469 auctions were successful out of 1,142 auctions beyond 
                                              
7 508 = 22 + 17 + 469 
8 Bids are measured by two values. One is the number of lenders who bid on the auction. The other is bid amount. This also 
applies to other hypotheses. There is a high correlation between these two variables, but we would like to confirm whether 
there is any difference. 
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20% of participation. Let’s assume that an auction’s participation levels up from 80% to 90%, then its 
success probability improves from 92.3% 9  to 96.5% 10 . Hence, the net increase of loan success 
probability is about 20% (from 21% to 41%) when the participation level changes from 10% to 20%. 
However, that is only 4.2% (from 92.3% to 96.5%) when the participation moves from 80% to 90%. 
This is because the uncertainty level of being fully funded when an auction has very little participation 
is very high but that with higher participation evaporates quickly. This implies the following 
hypothesis. 
H2: There is a diminishing marginal effect of the participation rate.  
Bidders will weigh the quality of an auction not only by the participation rate but also by the speed of 
fulfilling the participation rate. It is not difficult to speculate that any auction attracting bids in the 
shorter time will be estimated as more attractive one to crowds than other auctions taking much longer 
time to fulfill the same participation. In other words, an auction with a 20% participation rate in the 
first day has a higher chance of being fully funded, but an auction with the same participation rate of 
20% in the last day of its duration would most likely fail. We therefore propose the following 
hypothesis. 
H3: Participation rate being equal, a newer auction attracts more bids. 
To prove herding behavior on Popfunding, other factors that influence lenders’ decision making 
should be controlled for. Petersen (2004) classified these factors into hard and soft information. Hard 
information is quantifiable, verifiable, and easily transmittable, while soft information is fuzzier and 
harder-to-quantify. Lin et al. (2009) suggested that social networks in P2P lending act as a new source 
of soft information. They mentioned the positive effects of social networks on the funding success of 
borrowers. For Popfunding lenders, the number of postings on the Q&A board, which is automatically 
generated when a borrower posts a loan request, is interpreted as soft information in the form of 
activity in the social network. Also, the borrowers’ attributes affect the likelihood of funding success 
(Herzenstein et al. 2008). In our study, this factor is controlled by the number of verified certificates 
submitted by a borrower to Popfunding. It is regarded as hard information about the loan request. We 
predict that this soft information and hard information will also have a positive effect on Popfunding 
loans, resulting in the following hypotheses.  
H4: An auction with more postings on the Q&A board attracts more bids. 
H5: An auction with more verified certification attracts more bids. 
According to Herzenstein et al. (2008), the starting interest rate influences loan funding success. When 
people invest, they consider the payback period. No matter how high the interest rate, the 
attractiveness of an investment is diminished with a long payback period. The shortest payback period 
is 3 months and the longest is 24 months. Considering the starting interest rate and payback period, we 
propose the following hypotheses. 
H6: An auction with a higher starting interest rate attracts more bids. 
H7: An auction with a shorter payback period attracts more bids. 
We also consider a borrower’s loan request history on Popfunding as a factor that influences lenders. 
As previously mentioned, most Popfunding borrowers are non-bankable, which means that 
Popfunding has a feature of microfinance. Schreiner (1999) found that first-time borrowers are riskier 
than second-time borrowers in traditional microfinance. Therefore, Popfunding lenders may be able to 
retrieve some information from a borrower’s history11. If a borrower applied for a loan through 
Popfunding, successfully got the loan, and paid back the loan, the borrower would have a good 
                                              
9  469/(22 + 17 + 469) = 0.923 
10 469/(17 + 469) = 0.965 
11 Many borrowers have a past history with Popfunding. See Table 4. 
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reputation and credibility on Popfunding. However, a borrower who has several failed auctions can 
hardly take out a loan through Popfunding unless there is evidence of circumstantial change. We 
therefore suggest the following hypotheses. 
H8: An auction posted by a borrower with a history of more successfully funded auctions12 attracts 
more bids. 
H9: An auction posted by a borrower with a history of fewer failed auctions attracts more bids. 
An overview of the suggested hypotheses is presented in Table 2.  
 
Index Hypothesis 
H1 An auction with a higher participation rate attracts more bids. 
H2 There is a diminishing marginal effect of the participation rate. 
H3 Participation rate being equal, a newer auction attracts more bids. 
H4 An auction with more postings on the Q&A board attracts more bids. 
H5 An auction with more verified certification attracts more bids. 
H6 An auction with a higher starting interest rate attracts more bids. 
H7 An auction with a shorter payback period attracts more bids 
H8 An auction posted by a borrower with a history of more successfully funded auctions attracts more 
bids. 
H9 An auction posted by a borrower with a history of fewer failed auctions attracts more bids. 
Table 2. Hypotheses 
4 DATA 
4.1 Data Collection 
We used Popfunding’s daily data from June 15, 2009 to July 31, 2010 for this study. There are a total 
of 14,279 data items, including 2,236 auctions. Participation rate varies every time lenders bid on the 
auction, and age that refers to the number of days passed from the open date, increases by one each 
day even for the same auction. We set the unit of analysis as daily data to treat each day as different 
data. In our study, the Popfunding site is a marketplace, and auctions that lenders can invest in are 
considered goods in the market. 
4.2 Key Variables and Descriptive Statistics 
The key dependent variable in this empirical study is lender’s choice. We measure lender’s choice 
using two values. One is the number of bidders who invest in an auction, and the other is the total 
amount of money invested in an auction. There is a very high correlation between these two values13. 
However, there may be some different factors between small investors and big investors and, if so, 
these two dependent variables would reveal the difference. We use market share instead of the 
absolute number of bidders or the absolute value of the amount, because this automatically removes 
invisible influences, including weekend and holiday effects. Thus, our two dependent variables are the 
daily market share of the number of bidders, and the daily market share of bid amounts for each 
auction. To help readers understand this better, we provide an example. On June 1, 2010, the total 
amount of money invested in all Popfunding auctions active on that day was KRW 7,421,000. Among 
                                              
12 There are no borrowers who received a loan through Popfunding, did not repay the loan, and requested a loan again. Thus, 
the number of past auctions that were successfully funded is equal to the number of auctions successfully paid.  
13 The correlation value is 0.92. See Table 5.  
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these, the auction with index B100525-5 attracted KRW 195,000. Thus, the market share of bid 
amounts for this auction was 0.02614. 
The independent variables include predecessors’ choice and auction information available on 
Popfunding. The predecessors’ choice is represented by participation rate, which is calculated and 
provided by Popfunding. This variable enables us to investigate lenders’ herding behavior in the P2P 
lending market. Auction information includes loan decision variables such as starting interest rate and 
payback period. It also contains the number of postings on the Q&A board as soft information, and 
includes hard information such as the number of verified certificates submitted by a borrower, and the 
history of borrowers. Key variables are summarized in Table 3. Tables 4 and 5 represent the 
descriptive statistics of key variables and the correlation matrix between variables, respectively.  
 
Variable Description 
DailyShare_Biddersit Daily market share of the number of bidders in auction i, which opened t days ago 
DailyShare_Moneyit
 Daily market share of bid money in auction i, which opened t days ago 
ParticipationRateit
 Participation rate of auction i when it opened t days ago 
Ageit
 Number of days that auction i has been listed up to time t 
NumOfQnAit Cumulative total number of postings on the Q&A board of auction i up to time t 
NumOfCertificatsit
 Number of verified certificates submitted by the borrower of auction i  
InterestRateit
 Maximum interest rate of auction I suggested by the borrower (%) 
PaybackPeriodit
 Suggested duration for repayment of auction i by the borrower (months) 
PastSucit Number of past auctions successfully funded by the borrower who posted auction i 
PastFailit
 Number of past failed auctions by the borrower who posted auction i  
Table 3. Description of Key Variables15 
 
Variable N Mean Median S.D. Min. Max. 
DailyShare_Biddersit 14279 0.0289 0.0104 0.0535 0.0011 0.6943 
DailyShare_Moneyit
 14279 0.0289 0.0073 0.0613 0.000064 0.6902 
ParticipationRateit
 14279 11.2966 4 18.9206 0 348 
Ageit
 14279 5.9037 5 4.0721 1 16 
NumOfQnAit 14279 8.4180 5 10.7185 0 121 
NumOfCertificatsit
 14279 1.4069 0 2.2711 0 7 
InterestRateit
 14279 29.7299 30 1.9851 3 30 
PaybackPeriodit
 14279 14.5876 12 5.6471 3 24 
PastSucit
 14279 0.2437 0 0.6799 0 7 
PastFailit
 14279 2.7945 2 3.0787 0 37 
Table 4. Descriptive Statistics of Key Variables 
 
                                              
14 195,000/7,421,000 = 0.026 
15 NumOfCertificatesit, InterestRateit, RequestAmountit, and PaybackPeriodit are actually time-invariant. 
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Variable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
1. DailyShare_Bidderit 1          
2. DailyShare_Moneyit 0.92 1         
3. ParticipationRateit 0.65 0.59 1        
4. Ageit 0.19 0.21 0.37 1       
5. NumOfQnAit 0.44 0.44 0.50 0.37 1      
6. NumOfCertificatesit 0.16 0.16 0.14 0.05 0.20 1     
7. InterestRateit 0.05 0.03 0.05 0.03 0.04 0.11 1    
8. PaybackPeriodit -0.07 -0.03 -0.16 0.03 0.07 0.13 -0.08 1   
9. PastSucit 0.18 0.19 0.12 -0.01 0.10 0.05 0.04 0.16 1  
10. PastFailit 0.04 0.04 0.07 0.02 0.05 -0.02 0.09 -0.12 0.22 1 
Table 5. Correlation Matrix of Key Variables 
5 EMPIRICAL METHODOLOGY AND RESULTS 
5.1 The Empirical Model 
The objective of our study is to analyze lenders’ herding behavior in online P2P lending. To test our 
hypotheses, we employ the multinomial logit (MNL) market-share model. This model has been 
extensively applied in various fields to explain consumer choice among multiple discrete alternatives. 
Since it can deal with market response over time (Cooper 1993), it is appropriate for our circumstance. 
According to the MNL market-share model, the market share of the i-th product in a market of I 
products at time t is defined as follows: 
  Ii it
it
it
A
AS
1
                                                                                                                                   (1) 
where Ait represents the “attractiveness” of the product. The model specifies attractiveness as: 
)exp(
1   Kk itiktkiit XA                                                                                                    (2) 
where αt is a parameter for the intrinsic value of the i-th product and Xikt represents the k-th exploratory 
variable that may influence users’ decisions, and εit is the error term. Substituting equation (2) into 
equation (1), we derive the following: 
 

 


 I
i
K
k itiktki
it
K
k itiktki
it
X
X
S
1 1
1
)exp(
)exp(


                                                                                      (3) 
Since the MNL market-share model is originally nonlinear, we need to do the log-centering 
transformation in order to estimate the parameters using linear regression techniques (Cooper 1993). 
Taking logarithms on both sides of equation (3), we find: 
     Ij Kk jtjktkjKk itiktkiit XXS 1 11 )}{exp(ln)ln(                                    (4) 
If we sum equation (4) over i and divide it by I, we find: 
     Ij Kk jtjktkjKk tktkt XXS 1 11 )}{exp(ln)~ln(                                     (5) 
where tS
~  is the geometric mean of Sit, and  , ktX , and t  are the arithmetic means of αt , Xikt , and εit, 
respectively. Subtracting equation (5) from equation (4), we find: 
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   Kk titktiktkitit XXSS 1 )()()()~ln(                                                                   (6) 
Setting )(   ii  and considering that t  can be captured by time-fixed effects t , we reach the 
following reduced form: 
   Kk itktiktktitit XXSS 1 )()~ln(                                                                                 (7) 
Since i  denotes auction-specific fixed effects, and t  denotes time-related variables, or time-fixed 
effects, equation (7) leads to a typical panel data regression model. Our panel data consist of daily 
observations of auctions and their information on Popfunding. The auction-specific fixed effects 
capture the idiosyncratic and time-constant unobserved characteristics, which controls for intrinsic 
auction characteristics. The time-fixed effects capture any influence on market share due to timing 
differences.  
To use the equation in our context, a market is defined. Since auctions on Popfunding have similar 
features and compete to be chosen, it is natural to consider Popfunding as a single market. In this 
market, the individual lender’s choice is not observed, but lenders’ choices can be collectively 
measured by the daily market share. Thus, the daily market share of auction i at time t is captured as 
follows: 
  Ii it
it
it
rNumOfBidde
rNumOfBiddeBidderDailyShare
1
_                                                                               (8) 
  Ii it
it
it
BidAmount
BidAmountMoneyDailyShare
1
_                                                                                   (9) 
where itrNumOfBidde 	is the number of bidders who invest in auction i at time t and itBidAmount  is the 
total bid amount invested in auction i at time t. These two dependent variables are itS  in equations (1) 
through (7).  
To test H1, we include the variable 1itionRateParticipat , which represents the previous day’s 
participation rate of auction i that opened t days ago. Suppose that a borrower makes a loan auction 
requesting KRW 1 million today. The rate of participation of the auction today is 0. If the total amount 
of money that the auction attracts today is KRW 200,000, then the participation rate of the auction 
tomorrow is 0.2. The coefficient of this variable represents the jump in the number of bidders or the 
bid amount that the auction experiences. We also include as a variable the square term of 
1itionRateParticipat  ( 1itionRateSQParticipat ሻ. H2 indicates that the number of bidders and the amount 
of bid money are increasing and concave functions of the participation rate. The participation rate 
increases for an auction with a lower rate (e.g., increasing from 10% to 20%), leading to a steeper rise 
in the number of bidders and bid amounts than for an auction with a higher rate (e.g., increasing from 
80% to 90%). The coefficient of the quadratic term is therefore expected to be negative. To test H3, 
we add the interaction terms of 1itionRateParticipat 	and itAge  (ParticipationRate*Age). The 
coefficient of the interaction term represents how the impact of the rate of participation of an auction 
is moderated by the number of days that the auction has been listed up to the particular day. If the 
auction fails to be fully funded, the loan request auction is automatically canceled by the system. Thus, 
the age of the auction, which is the number of days that the auction has been listed up to that day, is 
meaningful for lenders. Suppose there are two auctions with the same participation, say 20%, today. 
One of the auctions opened yesterday, and the other opened 10 days ago. Since the former has a higher 
chance of being fully funded than the latter, the newer auction will be more attractive for lenders who 
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are considering investments in the P2P lending market. Therefore, the coefficient of the interaction 
term is expected to be negative.  
To test H4 through H9, we include variables itNumOfQnA , itficatesNumOfCerti , itteInterestRa , 
itiodPaybackPer ,	 itPastSuc , and itPastFail .  
According to our hypotheses mentioned above, the expected signs of independent variables are 
summarized in Table 6. 
 
Variable Expected Sign Variable Expected Sign 
ParticipationRate + InterestRate + 
ParticipationRateSQ - PaybackPeriod - 
(ParticipationRate)*(Age) - PastSuc + 
NumOfQnA + PastFail - 
NumOfCertificates +   
Table 6. Expected Sign of Independent Variables 
5.2 Results 
As mentioned earlier, we have one dependent variables with two measurements: the daily market 
share of bidders and daily market share of bid amounts. Table 7 represents the results with the former 
as a dependent variable, and Table 8 represents results with the latter.  
 
 Coefficient S.D. t-statistic 
1: ParticipationRate 4.4463 0.1103 40.3227*** 
2: ParticipationRateSQ -1.2951 0.0532 -24.3566*** 
3: (ParticipationRate)*(Age) -0.0370 0.0084 -4.4089*** 
4: NumOfQnA 0.0208 0.0008 26.6500*** 
5: NumOfCertificates 0.0796 0.0036 21.9715*** 
6: PaybackPeriod -0.0055 0.0013 -4.2783*** 
7: InterestRate 0.0077 0.0033 2.3030** 
8: PastSuc 0.2616 0.0102 25.6068*** 
9: PastFail -0.0042 0.0022 -1.9053* 
N = 14,279,  R2 = 0.5157,  adjusted R2 = 0.5154 
Table 7. Results with daily market share of bidders as dependent variable16 
 
 Coefficient S.D. t-statistic 
1: ParticipationRate 5.3813 0.2092 25.7201*** 
2: ParticipationRateSQ -1.1723 0.1009 -17.0827*** 
3: (ParticipationRate)*(Age) -0.0319 0.0159 -1.9990** 
4: NumOfQnA 0.0370 0.0015 25.0013*** 
                                              
16 *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels respectively. This also applies to Table 8.  
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5: NumOfCertificates 0.1654 0.0069 24.0426*** 
6: PaybackPeriod -0.0146 0.0024 -5.9507*** 
7: InterestRate 0.0299 0.0063 4.7108*** 
8: PastSuc 0.4256 0.0194 21.9579*** 
9: PastFail -0.0016 0.0042 -0.3687 
N = 14,279,  R2 = 0.3794,  adjusted R2 = 0.3790 
Table 8. Results with daily market share of bid amounts as dependent variable 
According to Tables 7 and 8, all hypotheses are accepted except H9-2. Lenders in the P2P lending 
market tend to herd, and there is a diminishing marginal effect of the herding behavior. Both soft 
information and hard information are also important factors for lenders. With regards to H9-2, it can 
be interpreted as follows. When lenders decide whether or not to invest, and how much money to 
invest, the failure history of a borrower is not an important factor. This may be because the borrower is 
better prepared for a loan request after past failures. 
6 CONCLUSION 
We studied P2P lending, through which individuals make unsecured loans to other individuals without 
the intervention of financial intermediaries. In particular, we provided a systematic analysis of lenders’ 
herding behavior in the online P2P lending market through empirical investigation, and found strong 
evidence of herding behavior. We also presented the diminishing marginal effect of the herding 
behavior.  
Although this research sheds light on lenders’ herding behavior, it has some limitations. First, the 
participation rate goes up in real time when a lender invests in an auction. However, we measured it by 
the value of participation rate until the previous day. This would not be a problem in the early days of 
an auction, but results may be less precise for the last day. The bidders are highly attracted during the 
last day when an auction becomes fully funded, as we have shown in Figure 1. In this case, our 
measure of participation rate is not accurate. In addition, we did not take into account the content of 
descriptions written by the borrowers about their situations. Most Popfunding borrowers are non-
bankable, which means that they are financially desperate. According to a survey conducted by 
Popfunding, lenders gain an emotional benefit from helping the poor by investing in their auctions. To 
test this emotional impact, content analysis is required.  
According to Bikhchandani et al. (1992), the primary mechanisms for herd behavior are informational 
cascades, sanctions on deviants, positive payoff externalities, and conformity preference. It would be 
interesting to examine the main mechanism that induces herd behavior in online P2P lending.  
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